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ABSTRACT
Open borders imply systems competition.  This paper studies the implications of systems
competition for the national competition rules. It is shown that an equilibrium where all countries
retain their antitrust laws does not exist, since abolishing this law makes it possible for a single
country to establish a cartel that  successfully appropriates  foreign business profits. Instead of such
an equilibrium, a deregulation race is likely to emerge in which all but the last country repeal their
antitrust laws. The deregulation race results in a chain of Stackelberg leadership positions taken over
by national cartels that renders lower profits and higher consumer rents than would have been the
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Europe, indeed the whole world, is now at the start of a new stage of development in which the
landscape of its firms is being redrawn. The common European market has been created, and
international competition has become far more intense in the process of globalization than anyone
could have anticipated. In the years to come the world of large firms will be completely
restructured. Economists have been astonished by the increasingly frequent news reports about
mega mergers and "strategic alliances" which previouslywould have been quite unthinkable.
Former bitter rivals are now amalgamating and creating conglomerates that occupy large shares
of the domestic markets. European companies, in particular, have been caught up in the wave of
mergers. These companies feel they must prepare for globalizationand are now attempting to put
themselves in the best possible position do this. The belief in the importance of getting a good
start is widespread. The conglomerate which gets into position first can occupy ground before the
others come. It enjoys a first mover advantage, forcing its followers to content themselves with
the share of the market that remains.
In this situation, the national cartel authorities will face considerable pressure to distance
themselves from their old established ideas and make it easier for strategic alliances and mergers
between firms to take place by relaxing the restrictions on them as rapidly as possible. Domestic
competition is now taking second place to international competition and this is forcing thecartel
authorities to behave like competitors themselves.
It was the credo of German "ordo liberalism" and similar neo-liberal lines of thought in
the US that, although an unconstrained competitive market economy would be able to ensure an
efficient allocation of resources, this type of economy would be inherently unstable. The
competing firms would always have an incentive to merge, because, by doing so, theycould2
impose limits on the quantities sold in the market, increase their prices and raise their profits. A
cartel authority would be necessary to stabilize the competition and it would do so by prohibiting
the collusion of firms. Competition could only function if it was subject to strict rules enforced by
the state. The German Antitrust Law and the Federal Cartel Office were established as a result of
this way of thinking, and other countries have chosen similar policies even though they have
preferred to name them differently.
The ordo liberal recommendations obviously make sense in a closed economy. A
government which endeavors to maximize the welfare of its citizens will try to establish effective
monopoly controls in order to produce a workable form of competition. The question is, how will
this incentive structure change in the era of globalization? How will the forces of systems
competition influence the behavior of the cartel authorities and the decisions of the legislators. if
these legislators are concerned with the welfare of their own people? Has an ordo liberal
economic policy any chance of surviving in the competition between systems?
Interest in ordo liberal policies has already waned as a result of the globalization of the
economy. Warnings about domestic mergers are usually pushedaside by arguing that
international competition is fierce and that the domestic industries must be armed against this
competition. The ordo liberal credo is tottering. It is not quite clear whether a retreat from the
ordo liberal way of thinking is really wise from a national point of view and it is even less clear
whether, if this retreat is universal, a rational international competitive equilibrium will follow.
The direction that will be taken by the competition between competition rules and whether this
competition will ever be workable are open questions.
In view of the ensuing theoretical difficulties, this analysis can only deal with these
problems in a very rudimentary way and must limit itself to providing food for thought.3
Theoretical rigor, freedom from value judgement and verifiability of the analysis must precede a
balanced political judgemcnt.
2. Regulating the Domestic Monopoly
Before analyzing the competition between competition rules, it will be useful to briefly review
the ordo liberal arguments for putting restrictions on setting up domestic cartels and company
mergers. For the well informed reader, in this introductory sectionit will be sufficient to go
quickly over the definitions of the variables and certain simplified basic assumptions.
Restricting cartels is necessary because competitive firms always have an incentive to
merge to the disadvantage of the consumer. The cartel reduces the quantityit sells and thus raises
prices. Whether this will cause revenue to rise or fall is not clear, In any case, costs will fall and
profits will rise because of the reduction in sales. The consumers get the worst of the bargain.
They pay higher prices, and the consumer surplus becomes smaller. On balance, setting up cartels
is a loss for society because the cartel gains less than the consumers lose. Ordo liberal policy
prevents this happening by prohibiting cartels and mergers.
This relationship can be illustrated with the textbook oligopoly model with n identical
firms, linear demand, constant marginal costs c, and homogeneous products. The individual firm /
chooses its quantity supplied X/underthe Cournot-Nash assumption that it has no influence on
the quantities planned by other firms, but that it can influence the common market price P to a
limited extent through its own decision. A market equilibrium is reached when the market clears4
and all quantities are chosen so that no supplier has any incentive to change its quantity1 .The








Here -b is the slope of the demand curve, and K the quantity that would be sold in a competitive




The profit maximizing conditions for problem (1) are
As Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) have shown, the Cournot- Nash model also can be substantiated very well in a5
(2) P(X)+P'(X)x,=c V i=l,..,,n.
These say that the marginal revenue equals the marginal cost of production. The marginal
revenue from the sale of one more unit of the product is equal to the price at which this unit can
be sold minus the reduction in revenue resulting from the fact that the sale of the extra unit is
only possible if the infra marginal units are sold at a lower price. It is expressed by the term F'
(X)xwhichis negative because F' <0.
The reduction in revenue with the infra marginal units obviously implies that P(X) >
thatis, that price is above marginal cost and the quantity sold is below the competitive quantity
K. The effect is stronger, the larger the market share of the individual firm, because the share of
the total detriment resulting from the price reduction that the individual firm has to bear is larger.





where 1/n is the market share, Applying equation (1), it follows from (3), with a little
transformation, that
two step game structure, where first the capacities, and then the prices, are set as in a Bertrand competition.6
(4) X =
1K (competition, Cournot-Nash behavior).
—+1
n
This expression shows that, with linear demand, the quantity sold is a simple falling function of
the market share of the single firm. In the extreme case of a monopoly, (1/n =1),the quantity
sold is half the competitive quantity X =K/2, and in the other extreme case where the market share
approaches zero, 1/n —*0,it is equal to the competitive quantity X=K.
The deeper reason for this implication of alternative market shares is negative externality
the single firm imposes on other firms by forcing them to lower their price if it decides to
increase its sales, The smaller the market share the smaller is this externality and lower is the
single firm's incentive to deviate from the monopoly quantity. The externalitycan be
internalized by merging with other firms or by establishing a cartel. With perfect collusion, there
is no externality, and with a linear demand curve and constant marginal costs, only half the
competitive quantity is produced.
Figure 1 illustrates these relationships. In a price —quantitydiagram it shows the marginal
cost curve c, the demand curve P (A) and the marginal revenue curve for the cartel. The last
mentioned graphs the left hand side of equation (3) for the case where n =1. Using the particular
linear demand curve (1), the marginal revenue curve starts at the same place on the ordinate as
the demand curve, that is, at point A, and it is twice as steep as the latter. In the cartel optimum,
F, the marginal revenue equals the marginal cost and the price is above the marginal cost by the
amount BF. With an oligopoly of five suppliers, on the other hand, the markup would be only






Figure 1: The Ordo Liberal Creed
Setting up the cartel benefits the suppliers because profit increases by the area FEL.
(Since the revenue can be measured by the area under the marginal revenue curve and cost by the
area under the marginal cost curve.) At the same time social welfare falls. Social welfare can be
defined as the sum of all economic surpluses, which are equal to the difference between the
consumers' maximum willingness to pay —thearea under the demand curve —andthe production
costs —thearea under the marginal cost curve. With perfect competition, where price equals
marginal cost, social welfare is measured by the triangle ADO, with the oligopoly (with five











cartel obviously brings about a reduction in the total surplus of BCEF, although profit, which is
part of this total, increases. The cake is smaller but the producers can cut themselves an
absolutely bigger piece of it.
The economic inefficiency of setting up a cartel proved in this way is the basis of the ordo
liberal credo. The economy can be protected from the damaging effects of empowering the
market by means of effective antitrust controls. In the present example, antitrust regulation would
prevent welfare from falling by the area BCEF.
3. The Retreat from Ordo Liberal Policy in the Open Economy
The question of whether an ordo liberal equilibrium exists in the competition between systems
will now be examined. Equilibrium is defined as a situation in which a parliament acting in the
national interest prohibits cartels if all other governments do the same. For use in a theoretical
model, the term "cartel" will be defined here in the classical sense. The members of the cartel
make binding arrangements about the quantities produced and ensure that these are kept to by
including appropriate sanctions in the contract. Everybody finds these arrangements credible. No
credible quantity commitments would be possible without the cartel. The cartel may also be taken
to reflect approximately other forms of amalgamations, such as takeovers, mergers, or strategic
alliances.
Assume that there is a limited number of identical countries over which the identical firms
are equally distributed. As in the initial model, constant average costs and linear demand curves
are assumed. Parliaments chose their competition laws so as to maximize national social welfare.
Where the countries' borders are closed, all parliaments will prohibit cartels. As was
shown in the previous section, such a prohibition on cartels leads to a higher level of national9
welfare than where cartels are permitted. The question is whether prohibiting cartels will also
maximize national welfare when the borders are opened and there is a common international
market for all the firms of a branch2. A positive answer to this question is necessary for the
existence of an ordo liberal equilibrium in the competition between competition rules.
The existence of such an equilibrium can only be usefully studied when it is assumed that
setting up cartels is damaging to competition. This sounds more trivial than it really is. If the
number of firms in the international market is large enough for genuine competition to take place
despite setting up cartels in one of the countries, at least partial erosion of the antitrust laws
would not be damaging. This would be the case when, for example, the convenient, and for many
purposes permissible, assumption of a small country unable to affect the world market price
through its own actions is made. A problem worth studying only arises when in the initial
situation there are already sufficiently few firms for expecting that establishing a cartel of the
firms in one country will have a significant influence on the price level. This is the ease that will
be considered in what follows.
Stackelberg position through lifting the prohi bition on cartels
The model initially used is sufficient for analyzing the strategic situation of the supervisory
authorities and/or the legislators in a systems competition. It is assumed that n firms are equally
distributed over z countries between which free trade in goods is allowed. The first m firms are
located in various countries where the ordo liberal economic policies are in place. The remaining
2Inwhat follows, national welfare will be defined as the sum of national profits and consumer surpluses. Little
would change in the following model when it is assumed that the national parliament maximizes the profits of the
domestic firms rather than the national welfare, which Olson's (1965) theory of the political dominance of the
producers interests would imply.10
n —mfirms may belong to a certain country, which we will call "Germany", which is
considering lifting the prohibition on cartels.
If Germany lifts its ban on cartels, it creates a starting advantage for the German firms.
The starting advantage comes from their now being able to credibly set their production capacity
by means of a reciprocal cartel agreement, so that the firms in the other countries are now only
able to adapt as best they can. In this case the government helps the German firms to occupy the
position of a Stackelberg leader, while the firms in the other countries are prevented from setting
their own quantities by the cartel prohibition. The Stackelberg leader knows how its rivals would
react to its own behavior and uses this knowledge to arrive at the best possible, profit
maximizing, decision. Unlike in the Cournot-Nash model, where all the players are in
symmetrical positions, the leader does not assume that it must adapt to the quantity set by the
others. It knows that it can confront the others with its own production capacity and, to this
extent, present them with a fait accompli,
The behavior of the firms in the other countries which can only react must be examined
next in order to determine the optimal policy of the Stackelberg leader. This behavior will be
determined by the rules set out in the previous section, i.e. by condition (2). Now, though, the





(6) Xl? x, and X(.
/=1Ill
are the total quantities supplied. Here G stands for Germany and R stands for the rest of the
countries. Using (1), it follows from (2) that the supply of an individual firm which is located in
the other countries is determined by the equation
(7) x,=K—X Vi=1,...,m.
The gap between the total supply and the competitive quantity is thus just equal to the supply of
the individual firm which behaves as a Cournot-Nash adapter. Given the quantity supplied by all
the other firms, the individual firm can still vary the total supply within a certain range up to the
competitive quantity. As it is faced with a decision problem like that of a monopolist it will cover
half of this range with its supply, that is, it will leave a gap between the total quantity and the
competitive quantity equal to the quantity it supplies itself
Summing all m equations of type (7), and taking (5) and (6) into account, gives the total
supply of the firms (which are not in cartels) in the rest of the countries, formally like in (4), as
(8) Xj?=11(K—XG)
This reacts negatively to the quantity supplied chosen by the German cartel and covers a fixed
share, ii[I+ l9of the difference between the competitive supply and the German supply.
Knowing this reaction pattern, the German cartel can choose its quantity X(1 so as to maximize
its profits. The decision problem of the German cartel is12
(9) max P(X)X(. —cX(
subject to (5) and (8).







From the first order condition of this optimization problem it follows that
(10)
which means that the German cartel provides half the competitivequantity just as a monopolist
does. The firms of the rest of the world, which are not in a cartel, comply with rule(8), and thus.





The total quantity supplied is




Taking a Stackelberg position can increase the "German" profits and the "German" welfare but
it does not have to. Because of the revealed preference theorem, the profits increase when the
quantity sold changes compared to the Cournot game. And the consumer surplus obviously only
rises when the price falls and this requires there to be higher total sales. When taking a
Stackelberg position results in the same aggregate quantity sold as in the case where the antitrust
laws are retained, then neither German profits nor German welfare change3. When the aggregate
quantity sold falls, the German profits increase but the consumer surplus falls. Only when the
quantity sold increases when a cartel is established can an increase in both the profits of the
German firms and the German consumer surplus be expected, providing strong incentives for the
German legislator to abolish the antitrust law.
The change in the quantity sold as a result of establishing a cartel is the net effect of two
counteracting forces. On the one hand, the cartelization of the German firms leads to a reduction
in the number of competitors in the international market and this tends to reduce the quantity
sold. This effect is similar to the one that makes it wise not to permit cartelization in a closed
economy. On the other hand, in an open economy, the Stackelberg leader may be able to expand
sales at the expense of his rivals, increasing the aggregate quantity sold. This effect resembles
the one emphasized by the strategic trade literature4. If there were sufficiently many German
firms initially relative to the number of firms in the rest of the world, the first effect would
dominate, and the aggregate quantity sold would fall. If, on the contrary, there was only one
The profits and the welfare of the other countries also remain constant.14
German firm initially, and if this firm was now able to position itself ahead of the other firms,
that is, to change from a Cournot- Nash player to a Stackelberg player, there wouldcertainly be
an increase in the aggregate quantity. In which direction the quantity supplied will change when
the number of German firms is between the two extremes is not obvious.
Letting XA stand for the quantity sold which results when all antitrust laws are in force and
X stand for the quantity which, in the case of the Stackelberg game, results from abolishing the
German antitrust law, then, after a little transformation,
(12)
xv{}xArn+l{}n_rn
follows from (4) and (11). The result says that establishing a cartel of German firms leads toan
increase in total sales, and thus to a fall in price, when the number of firms in the other countries,
rn, is larger than, or equal to, the number of German firms before the cartel was set up, n-rn. Only
when in the initial situation there are at least two more firms in Germany than thereare in the rest
of the world, will the quantity sold fall and the price level rise. Because identical countrieswere
assumed, this case is not possible here, and of course, it is not realistic where a country like
Germany is being considered. Thus the national consumer surplus unambiguously increases as a
result of setting up the cartel. The following consequences emerge.
See Brander and Spencer (1981).15
Proposition 1: In autarchy each country maximizes its own welfare when it imposes an effective
antitrust regulation. However, once the borders are opened, it is in the national interest ofany
single country to repeal this regulation and make it possible for the national firms to jbrm a
cartel. Using binding quantity commitments, the cartel will take on a Stackelberg leadership
position f the other countries continue to stick to ordo liberal policies. The leadership position
results in an increase of national welfare by lowering prices and shifting profits from .foreign to
domestic pockets. Therefore, an ordo liberal equilibrium does not exist in systems competition.
Oligopoly of national cartels
The result just derived is a negative one. It says that with ordo liberal policies no equilibrium
exists in the competition between systems. It does not say that a country will be able to take on
the position of a Stackelberg leader thanks to a liberal cartel policy. It should probably be
assumed that the other countries will also get rid of their antitrust laws and allow their own firms
to form national cartels. In this case, the German cartel may not achieve the position of a
Stackelberg leader, so that the different national cartels interact again in the sense of a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium.
The total quantity sold, will, analogously to (4), be given by the equation
X = K (simultaneous deregulation in all countries)
where z is the number of national cartels or countries. Since there are fewer supplying countries
than firms, z <n,a comparison with (4) shows that such an equilibrium would be associated with16
smaller quantities, and thus higher prices, than in the initial equilibrium where ordo liberal
policies were chosen in all countries. The welfare in every country would be smaller in a
symmetrical equilibrium than in the case of a uniform ordo liberal policy.
If it were assumed that the countries taking part in the systems competition are
collectively rational, the prospect of getting such an equilibrium after abolishing the antitrust laws
would be off putting enough to cause them to stick with their ordo liberal policies. However, the
assumption of collective rationality is not only a long way from reality, it is also inadmissible for
the analysis of the competition between systems. Competition is an activity where the actors
exhibit individual rationality and selfish goals and where they neither make arrangements with
one another nor coordinate their actions. From this perspective, it cannot be expected that a single
country will refrain from abolishing its antitrust laws.
4. The Deregulation Race
It is not very likely, though, that the result of a systems competition in which ordo liberal policy
is generally given up can be described by a Cournot oligopoly model, because, under realistic
conditions, the repeal of the antitrust laws will occur sequentially not simultaneously. Countries
with strong powerful governments will reject the policy first, those with weak governments will
follow after a delay, and some countries will first have to overcome the impediments to a reform
of the antitrust laws even after many other countries have deregulated. In such a situation, it
counts to be quick in order to achieve the position of a Stackelberg leader. A country which,
thanks to rapid deregulation, is able to establish universally respected conglomerates of firms
more quickly, than other countries can, has created facts which the firms of all successive
countries must take into account in planning their own capacities. Speed is important. First come,17
first served —butthose who come second or third may still be better off than those who come
even later because they, too, can create unalterable facts for the latecomers. The later you come,
the more ground is already occupied and the smaller the position that you must be content with. A
deregulation race starts because the starting position will decide long term success.
A sub-game perfect equilibrium
The order in which the countries' governments make the decision about repealing the national
antitrust law depends on national features which are not considered here and, indeed, it is not
important to do this. What is important is to know how the parliaments decide when it is their
turn and how the private firms behave as a result. The parliament has three choices.
-Itmay repeal its antitrust law immediately.
-Itmay repeal its antitrust law later, after other parliaments have done so.
-Itmay decide never to repeal its antitrust law.
Firms also have similar decision opportunities, because setting up a cartel is a right, but
not a duty. If the national antitrust law is not repealed (and possibly before it is repealed), the
firms in the country are not in a position to make binding quantity agreements and thus they
behave like Cournot-Nash competitors, adapting themselves to the quantities fixed by the
national cartels of the other countries. Once the national antitrust law is repealed, the firms of a
country
-mayimmediately build a national cartel,
-maydecide to build such a cartel later or
-decidenot to cartelize at all.18
As assumed above, all countries are the same size and have the same number of firms in,
in ￿2,with the same constant average and marginal cost c.Thebuyers are distributed equally
over all countries.
A deductive solution to the game structure just described is extremely difficult because
of the large number of possible decisions. Another method will therefore be used here. We start
with a conjecture about the behavior of the parliaments and firms (a), continue with a recursive
calculation of the details of the game among the firms which results from the parliaments'
conjectured decisions (b), and conclude with the proof that no parliament can make its country,
and no firm can make its owners, better off when they make policy decisions different from those
conjectured (c).
(a) The conjecture is that each national parliament uses its scope for decision making to repeal
the antitrust law as soon as the chance arises and as long as there is at least one other parliament
that has not yet decided to repeal the law. The repeal makes it possible for the national firms to
establish cartels and to credibly set the quantities they sell in advance of other firms in order to
shift profits to their own pockets. It is conjectured that only the parliament that is the last to
decide does not repeal, because by doing so it will not bring about a profit transfer but only a
reduction in the consumer surplus. It is also conjectured that the firms immediately use the right
to establish a national cartel as soon as their parliament allows them to.
(b) In order to analyze the behavior of the firms in detail, given the conjectured behavior of the
parliaments, the decision situation of the players must be looked at recursively. Technically
speaking, the task is finding a sub-game perfect solution for the quantity planning of the firms.19
The players are the firms of the z countries. The countries will be numbered in reverse order of
their decision to repeal the national antitrust law, where the last country, which is conjectured to
retain the law, will be number 1. The last country will produce the quantity x1,thesecond last x7,
the third last x3, and so on. The total quantity that the i last countries produce is X and the total
quantity that the z-i previous countries produce is X.
For the moment, it will still be assumed, in accordance with the conjecture described, that
the firms use the right to form a cartel as soon as they are allowed to. At the moment, it is not a
question of whether they will use it, but how they use it when they do.
The firms of the last country, I, are confronted with fixed quantity X', X <K given
by the earlier players, where K is once again the competitive quantity, that is, the quantity at
which the international demand curve cuts the horizontal marginal cost curve. The firms in
country 1 play a Cournot-Nash game because of the cartel ban and thus choose, analogously to
(8), the aggregate quantity
1 1 (Ii) Xl?xl=
1(K—XA )
m
where m is now the number of firms in country 1. The second last country, 2, has, as conjectured,
a cartel which is confronted with the given aggregate quantity chosen by the previous cartels
X, X2 ￿ X. The cartel knows from (13) and
(14) X'x, + X220
that it can influence the quantity chosen by the firms of country 1. It solves the maximizing
problem
maxP(X)x2—cx,, X=Xh+x2+X22
subject to (13) and given XfJ
Because of(l) and (14)
(15) x2
follows from this, which then determines
(16) Xx,+Xh.
The cartel of the third last country is faced with the fixed quantity Xj3,X3￿ X given by the
z —3earlier cartels and knows from (13), (15) and
x-2x3+
howit can influence the behavior of the succeeding countries with its quantity decision. It solves
the maximization problem21
maxP(X).x3 —cx3, X=X +x3 +X
subject to (13) and (15) given X3
which, because of(1), (15) and (16), determines
(17)
and therefore also
The chain of decisions continues in a similar fashion. The cartel of the i-th last country solves the
problem
max P(X).x1—cx1, X=X'+x1+X'
once again subject to the solutions for all succeeding countries and given the decisions of all
preceding ones as summarized by X'. It chooses the quantity
(18)
which determines22
This formula also holds for the cartel of the first country, i=z, where, of course,
xi=0.
The simple decision rule in such a sub-game perfect equilibrium is that country i covers with its
production half the range K —X'between the competitive level and the quantity given by the
previous cartels. This decision rule can once again be understood by comparing it with the profit
maximizing decision rule of a monopolist. The monopolist, too, supplies exactly half of the range
available to him when the demand curve is linear. The difference from the monopoly case is only
that the range no longer starts at zero but at the quantity given by the previous cartels, and that the
perceived demand curve is flatter because it also takes account of the fact that the cartel can partly
drive out the quantities of the following countries if it decides to expand its own quantity. As the
slope of the perceived demand curve, given the competitive quantity K where the demand curve
intersects the marginal cost curve, has no influence on the quantity planning, the number of
countries that follow plays no role for a particular cartel's decision. In every case, it will itself
cover half of the range still open to it.
Country 1 is the only exception to the rule that the quantity supplied is exactly half the
still available range up to the competitive quantity because no cartel will be set up in that country.
The oligopoly of the infirmsin this country also covers a fixed share of the range K —X1,but
this share is in/(l+m) which, because m ￿2, is more than 1/2 (atleast 2/3). Interestingly, thenflLi
numberof firms in this country has no influence on the prior cartels although the total sales
quantity is an increasing, and the product price is a falling, function of this number. An increase
in the number of firms in country 1 would only make the perceived demand curves of the prior
cartels flatter, but it would not influence those cartels' profit maximizing quantities. Even if
country 1 permitted a monopolistic policy with m =1, this would have noinfluence on the
quantity planning of the previous cartels. This can be easily seen as x2, x3 andx in (15), (17) and
(18) are independent of m
(c) It is now time to prove that the conjectured behavior of the national parliaments andfirms
does actually maximize their national welfare. Consider the parliaments first. There are, in
principle, three options open to the parliament of a particular country at the exogenouslyfixed
time of decision. It can repeal the antitrust law. It can decide to enter the time hierarchy after a
country that comes later and then repeal the law. And it can refrain from repealingthe law at all.
For the moment, it is still assumed that the firms use the right to set up a cartel as soon as they are
allowed to.
Let us begin once more with the parliament which decides last. This parliament does not
have the three options, because there is no other parliament whose decision it can wait for. It can
only choose between repealing and retaining its antitrust law, It was conjectured that itretains
the antitrust law.
Suppose, to the contrary, that the law is repealed. In this case the firms in the country set
up a cartel and decide as a monopolist would in relation tothe remaining range, that is, they fix a
/ m/ , . ,
quantity—K —X)ratherthan —
X:1).Thismeans a price increase, A F, which
2
£ 1+m
lowers the country's consumer surplus and increases its profits. The key question for the24
parliament is which effect predominates. Only if the former does, such that there is a net welfare
loss, will our conjecture that the country does not repeal its antitrust law be correct.
For the size of the loss of consumer surplus, AV,
(19) AV>.1[X+I(K_X)]
holdsas can easily be concluded, since the share liz of the consumers lives in country 1 and since
the right hand side of (19) contains the part of the loss of consumer surplus that results from the
price increase with a given quantity, but not the part that results from a fall in quantity with a
given price. Considering that the optimal decision rule of the cartels according to (18) implies
(20)
it follows from (19), after a little transformation, that
(21)
AV>AP.IK[l__LJ
On the other hand, taking (20) into account, the estimation
(22) AG<AP.I(K-X)=AP1K
2 2225
holds for the increase in the firms' profits, A G, because the right hand side of(22) only covers
the profit increasing effect of a price increase with given quantity, and not theprofit reducing
effect that results from a reduction in quantity with a given price. It obviously follows from(21)
and (22) that AV>AG, when
AP—KIl-—> •—K
z 2z) 2
or, what amounts to the same thing, when
2z >l+z.
Since this condition is satisfied for all z￿2 it is clear that country I will, as assumed,really not
repeal its antitrust law. The repeal would increase the profits but would lower the sum of the
national consumer and producer rents.
Next, whether country 2 could improve its position by choosing a different policy must be
examined. Let us first consider the case where it retains its antitrust law whilecountry 1 does so,
too. In this case, country 2 is clearly worse off than when it repeals its antitrust law. It is
sufficient here to outline the proof because the result can be derived analogously toProposition 1.
In the case of a cartel ban, the firms of country 1 and country 2 are in thesame situation as the n
firmsin the whole economy which was considered when deriving this proposition. Theonly
difference is that the range available to the firms is narrowed by the quantity X2 alreadygiven.
Taking into account that 2m rather than n firms take part in the Cournot game, it is found
analogously to (4) that26
= (K_X2) (Cournot)
2m




2m.I(_X2) (Stackelberg). 1+m 2
Analogously to (12), it is immediately obvious from the comparison of the two magnitudes that
the last two countries taken together produce a bigger quantity with the Stackelberg solution and,
because of the revealed preference theorem, this indicates both a higher profit anda higher
consumer surplus for country 2. Country 2 will therefore not renounce its Stackelberg position
when it believes that country 1 will continue to play a Cournotgame.
A fortiori, country 2 will not renounce its Stackelberg position when doing so would lead
to country 1 preceding it and taking the Stackelberg position itself Since the Stackelberg leader
chooses a higher quantity and makes a larger profit than its followers and since thechange of
places will affect neither the aggregate quantity supplied nor the price the consumers have topay.
it certainly never pays to leave the leadership position to anothercountry. Country 2 will thus
also behave as conjectured, that is, it will repeal its antitrust law when it can do so.
Let us now look at country 3, which is the country that can decide beforecountry 2. Its
situation is clear. If it does not use its opportunity to decide and repeals its antitrust lawso late27
that country 2 precedes it, its firms experience a reduction in profits. Changingplaces does not
alter the aggregate quantity supplied, the sales price or the consumer surplus.However, it cuts
the sales quantity and the profit of the domestic firms in half.If the country does not repeal its
antitrust law at all, it slips behind even country 1. Country 2will now behave as country 3 would
otherwise have, and country 1 as country 2 would have, thus taking aStackelberg position in
relation to country 3. Because, as was shown, country 2 wouldlose if it changed places with
country 1 by not repealing its antitrust law, country3 would lose a fortiori .Country3. too, will
therefore repeal its antitrust law as quickly as possible and usethe decision opportunity it has
been offered.
The conclusion we can infer for country 4 and the countrieswhich are able to decide even
earlier is obvious. Each individual country will behave exactly as conjecturedin (a) because any
other economic policy would lead to lower national welfare.
Finally the conjecture that firms cartelize as soon as they canhas to be proved. This is
trivial since the firms' decision possibilities, given the decisionsof their parliaments, are similar
to the three decision possibilities of the parliaments.The firms can set up the cartel, they can
postpone the decision to set up the carteluntil after the establishment of another cartel, or they
can choose not to set up a cartel at all. As postponingand doing without a cartel, would, as just
shown, reduce profits, the firms in each countrywill set up a cartel as soon as the national
antitrust law is repealed.
Proposition 2: The competition between competitionrules is a race to repeal the national
antitrust law as quickly as possible. The aim is to givethe own economy a lead in achieving an
early Stackelberg position, which it then exploits, as soon asit is allowed to. The quantity sold28
and the prqfit of the firms are smaller the later in the succession Icountriesthis country decides
to repeal its antitrust law. All countries except the last one repeal their antitrust laws. The lasi
country retains its law and thus forces its firms to behave like Cournot-Nash players. The
deregulation race between the national parliaments just described is a sub-game perfect
equilibrium in systems competition.
5. An Uncomfortable Proposition
The result derived confirms the judgement that once the borders between countries are opened
and competition between competition rules starts the day of ordo liberalism is over. The question
now is how is this result to be judged in allocative terms? Intuitively one would tend to reach a
negative judgement, because "cartelizingthe national markets" does not sound exactly
confidence inspiring. But semantics may not lead very far.
It follows from (13) that the range K—X1 which the z-1 first countries leave for the last
country, will be covered by that country's own production with the share in! (1+iii). The share of
this range not covered is therefore 1/(1+m). Moreover it follows from (20) that the range, which
the first z-1countriesleave for the last country, itself has a share of the competitive quantity K
equal to l/2z'. Taking these pieces of information together shows that in the deregulation race
the gap between the competitive quantity and the actual production is
K 1
(23) K —X=—---- (deregulationrace). 2 1+m29
The cartelization of the market made possible by the deregulation race can be prevented
either by harmonizing the regulation policies of all the individual countries or by creating a single
antitrust authority which covers all the countries. Such measures would force the firms in all
countries to behave in a Cournot-Nash manner, and, in accordance with (4), there would then be a
gap between the competitive quantity and total production equal to
(24) K —X=K
(cartel ban covering all countries) zm+l
where the number of firms n is replaced by the product of the number of countries and the
number of firms per country.
It obviously follows from (23) and (24) that total sales with the deregulation race are
larger than with the overall cartel ban, if
2(l+ m)> 1+zm
or, which comes to the same thing, if
> in(z —2)
This inequality will obviously hold when there are at least two countries and at least two firms
per country as was assumed. The following result is therefore obvious.30
Proposition 3: The deregulation race, which leads to a sequential repeal of the antitrust laws of
the individual countries, and which allows these countries' firms to setup national cartels,
results in higher total sales, lower prices, a higher consumer surplus and lower firm profits than
would be expected in the case of a cartel ban covering all countries.
Surprisingly, an all clear is appropriate for the allocation problem. Paradoxical and
uncomfortable as it may sound, a deregulation race that results in the cartelization of the national
markets does not threaten to be at the expense of the consumers or to lower the welfare of all
countries combined. On the contrary, at least in the symmetrical case of equally sized countries,
the deregulation race has a very positive effect from an allocative point of view.
This does not mean that the race for the starting position does not create problems. One of
the most serious of these is the very different distribution of profits which occurs in equilibrium.
The disadvantaged industries will find it difficult to accept the unequal distribution and will
attempt to achieve an equal distribution by means of centralized policy measures. The falling
aggregate sum of profits will also lend support to such a policy measure.
One of the measures to achieve an equal profit distribution would be the establishment of
an international antitrust board, preventing the single countries from taking on Stackelberg
leadership positions. Another one would be an international agreement to build one big cartel
covering all countries coupled with a sharing rule for the profits. However, all of this would
violate our basic assumption that governments are welfare maximizers. Welfare maximizing
governments would not agree to such centralized policy measures.31
6. Reconsideration of Regulation Policy
Europe is now at a new establishment stage in which new conglomerates of firms will be set up in
a big way in order to be prepared for an economy without borders. This applies particularly to
branches like banking and finance, for which a large European market where homogeneous
banking services can be supplied in the various countries has been created abruptly with the
introduction of the euro. But very many other branches will be affected too and will be
reorganized in order to get a good starting position in the new common market. In this situation
the interest in mergers is scarcely controllable and the national monopoly authorities and the
legislators will be under enormous pressure to liberalize the antitrust laws.
In fact, it is in the national interest to plan for more liberal antitrust laws than there could
have been in the old national states. A country which allows cartels to be set up by its own firms
while all other countries continue to carry out ordo liberal economic policies can place itself in an
absolutely better position. It paves the way for credible quantity agreements in cartel contracts
which the firms can exploit as Stackelberg leaders. The result is a shift of profits from foreign to
domestic firms which does not hurt the national consumers. An equilibrium in the competition
between systems where all countries continue to carry out traditional antitrust policies in their
own interest can thus scarcely exist.
It is more likely that there will be a deregulation race in which each country tries to create
the best possible starting position for its firms in the new Europe by repealing its antitrust law. In
that event, the deregulation race will lead to a cartelization of the national markets.
Such a cartclization is, however, more a problem for the distribution of profits than an
allocative worry that would endanger the provision of the European consumers. It is possible, if'13
notlikely, that a race for the starting position will result in an increase of aggregate supply,
falling prices and falling profits. Looked at in this way, a verdict about whether a competition
between competitive rules is workable would be premature. This competition leads to an erosion
of these regulatory systems, but this may be less bad than it appears at first.
This paper is highly theoretical and should be seen as a stimulus for further debates rather
than a balanced judgement on the future of ordo liberalism. It must be left to future scientific
discussions to show whether there are other models which confirm the pessimistic prejudice of
the ordo liberal economist. A critical judgement about the competition between systems would
have to be made if, instead of the race for starting positions modeled here, there were to be a
concerted loosening of the European antitrust laws, because then a classical oligopoly with a
smaller number of participants might be established. It is not clear what the national interest
would consist of with this solution, and, incidentally, because of the international arrangements,
this situation could hardly be called a systems competition.33
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